Public administration' increasingly takes place in settings of networked actors who necessarily rely on each other and cannot compel compliance on the part of the rest. Yet the standard writings to which most administrators turn for advice to improve performance devote relatively little attention to acting effectively in such situations. (Examples include Hill, 1992; Levine, Peters, and Thompson, 1990; and Wamsley et al., 1990.) Networks are structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement. Networks exhibit some structural stability but extend beyond formally established linkages and policylegitimated ties. The notion of network excludes mere formal hierarchies and perfect markets, but it includes a very wide range of structures in between. The institutional glue congealing networked ties may include authority bonds, exchange relations, and coalitions based on common interest, all within a single multiunit structure. In networks, administrators cannot be expected to exercise decisive leverage by virtue of their formal position. Influence in larger networks is more difficult to document, predict, and model than it is in relatively simple two-or threeparty relationships.
Scholarly work on public administration has proceeded for decades from the seminal contributions of Herbert Simon (1976) and others, who argued that hierarchy can "push back" the decision-making weaknesses experienced by individuals -converting their human limitations (like selective perception) into organizational strengths. This result is not inevitable, and it is the challenge of the manager to craft the contexts in which others must make decisions so that they will have what they need to make sound choices efficiently.
Part of the task is arranging the hierarchy so that each subunit can pay attention to itself and its near neighbors while largely ignoring the rest of the world, even the rest of the organization. "Near decomposability," which hierarchy permits, works (for Simon) because of an assumption about the world in which organizations operate: that complex tasks can usually be divided up into small, relatively independent components that can be treated separately while still contributing to the overall objective (1976, 69) . Later theorists noted that this assumption is probably too strong. Certainly hierarchy can bring some efficiency advantages even if the strict assumption does not hold. 2 If, however, the issues with which public managers are being asked to deal are increasingly what Rittel and Webber (1973) have called "wicked problems"-challenges that cannot be handled by dividing them up into simple pieces in near isolation from each other-then alternative forms of organizing must be more suitable. No clearly appropriate organizational form, or set of forms, has attracted general support. Matrix organizations, flexible work groups, and interagency coordinating committees are all structural responses to certain forms of "wickedness." But there is no comprehensive theory to suggest how to manage such organized effort.3 To the extent that public problems have acquired characteristics of wickedness, this article suggests that administrators are now either operating with inappropriate organizational models or adapting conventional structures to meet the more challenging demands. Versions of network development may be underway. What does the evidence suggest?
Why Treat Networks Seriously? Some Evidence
The data regarding the importance of networked action in public administration are not conclusive. Most of the evidence is indirect; however, if it indicates trends, it is fairly convincing. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the next section, the kinds of forces currently encouraging the expansion and proliferation of networks range far beyond those typically sketched by economists or organization theorists.
Kettl points out that direct federal spending for single-agency program operations accounts for a small slice of the huge national budget (1993, (61) (62) . At other levels of government, even with cutbacks in federal aid, intergovernmental programs make up a sizeable proportion of the total. This conclusion is especially clear when one counts state, local, interlocal, interstate, and nongrant efforts -including intergovernmental regulation. What is omitted by these measures is a congeries of programs involving more subtle arrays. "In addition to the huge role that state and local governments play in the 'Washington bureaucracy,' almost every major federal domestic policy directly involves either private contractors, or non-profit organizations, or both" (DiIulio and Kettl, 1995, 17) . It is worthwhile, therefore, to survey a broader range of collaborative efforts.
These efforts encompass several categories. First, governments often seek to execute their efforts via structures of interagency collaboration. Second, the role of not-for-profit organizations is large and growing. Third, the frequency and variety of links with forprofit firms is impressive, and government contracting remains a Pressures to offload direct service provision while alo assumingpolicy responsibility catalyzefurther networking through more complexpatterns that aim at splitting or sharing labor and responsibility. growth industry. More thoroughgoing forms of privatization are commonplace, despite the periodic expose, scandal, and disappointment. Public-private partnerships vary in several respects, but they typically involve government and profit-driven interests joined to increase the scale and visibility of program efforts, to increase support for projects, and to leverage capital to enhance feasibility, speed, or effectiveness. Indeed, they often involve not merely one private organization but a range of them. Many forms of entrepreneurial government effort touted by Osborne and Gaebler (1992) involve forms of networking not adequately captured in aggregate data on intergovernmental programs and contracting.
The extent of interunit patterns is considerable. Such structures often involve webs of public, not-for-profit, and business organizations in crosscutting configurations. Even at the international level, agreements on issues such as environmental quality have been translated into policy in many nations, and domestic program managers find themselves linked in multilevel and cross-national webs "from the negotiating table to the shop floor" (Hanf, 1994) .
Recent trends, including privatization, reinvention, budget cutting, and initiatives from the Republican Congress, are unlikely to stop or appreciably slow the phenomenon. Pressures to offload direct service provision while also assuming policy responsibility catalyze further networking through more complex patterns that aim at splitting or sharing labor and responsibility. This point is obvious when considered in the context of some recent policy initiatives, such as the proposals for reforming U.S. health care. Sometimes overlooked, however, are less-conspicuous instances such as the role played by intermediary institutions in service provision networks for any voucher-style policy initiative.
The Growing Importance of Networks
A contestable thesis can be suggested: Complex networks are not only relatively common, they are also likely to increase in number and importance. Why? The discussion of wicked policy problems suggests one reason, and additional forces seem to be at work as well. Policies dealing with ambitious or complex issues are likely to require networked structures for execution, and complex issues will continue to be on the policy agenda. Indeed, and this point can be considered a second influence, the limitations often established on the reach of direct governmental intervention encourage rather than dampen networked approaches. Preferences for limited, liberal government in the context of widespread support for action encourage complex, networked mechanisms for service delivery and management-extending the reach of government programs while loosening the immediate managerial grasp. Setting ambitious objectives in contexts of dispersed power makes networking imperative for program managers. Despite contrary sentiments and certain efforts to unwind the network spring, the emergence of networks in public management is not a passingfad. For all these reasons, it is reasonable to expect an increase in public administrative networking. Milward and Provan (1993) have used the evocative and vaguely threatening image of the "hollow state" to characterize what they regard as the increasingly networked character of public management (see also Milward, 1996) . They argue that practitioners in the coming years will face fundamental challenges to achieving the traditionally important norms of efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and accountability.
The case for a networked future should not be made too strongly. Some forms of policy change, such as initiatives to "hive off" public institutions or sell large quantities of public assets in the market, would signal a form of simplification. Similarly, administrative reorganizations could reduce cross-institutional interdependence for selected policy sectors. It is possible though perhaps not likely that some current reforms such as the Unfunded Mandate Control Act of 1995 may slow the growth substantially.
Despite contrary sentiments and certain efforts to unwind the network spring, the emergence of networks in public management is not a passing fad. Data suggest that these arrays have expanded beyond the small clusters that have been the focus of discussion in intergovernmental management and contract administration. Several influences appear to be at work to encourage further expansion. For all this admittedly spotty evidence, there has been relatively little impact on scholarship in the field. The dominant picture, as seen in courses, texts, and standard theories, is that of a universe centered around the individual agency and its management. Accordingly, there is plenty of work to be done to adapt what we think we know to the emerging networked world.
Practical and Research-Based Agendas
Treating networks seriously has not been a priority in the world of public administration. Still, the theme has not been ignored altogether.4 Some administrators have noted the prominence of networks in their operating setting and have begun to consider implications for practice. Researchers, too, have started to devote effort to topics that can enhance scholarly understanding of networks and public management.
What implications follow from a recognition of the importance of networks to the conduct of public administration? The coverage below addresses a portion of the agendas for the field.
The Practical Agenda
Ultimately, the most important question regarding networks and public administration is the pragmatic one: So what? What difference does it make in practice if administrators are situated in complex structures of networked interdependence? The answer is not obvious. Important parts of the response must be informed by research that is only just beginning. However, just as the assumption of formal hierarchy provided clues regarding how to manage in an earlier era, the distinctive features of network structures offer some very preliminary hints for practice.
First, standard nostrums of public administration probably do not apply. Managers in networked settings do not supervise most of those on whom their own performance relies, monitoring channels are typically diffuse and unreliable, and common organizational culture exercises a limited and indirect influence. In network arrays, several sets of organizational needs must somehow be incorporated into streams of action without compromising programs to the point of incoherence. Perhaps most important, networks themselves are sufficiently complex that their impact on performance is somewhat unpredictable for all involved. Managing in this world implies significant adjustment of the conventional wisdom. Indeed, the very notion of management may have to be modified. Needed forms of management may be counterintuitive. That is, action guided by the hierarchy assumption is likely to lead not just to ineffectual but to counterproductive outcomes.
The injunction is not merely to learn bargaining skills. In the world of networks, the results of dyadic negotiations (between public organization and its contracted agent, for instance) may be decisively influenced by background or default conditions established through decisions among parties elsewhere in the network (a social services coordinating council, a consolidation among private firms in the service-provision sector).
The practical agenda would seem to include, then, the following points as first steps for public administrators operating in a networked world:
1. Administrators should not assume that they possess authority; giving directives may actually weaken influence. 2. Administrators should conduct regular self-surveys of their network(s) to make a rough inventory of their principal contingencies and alliances. They need to be alert to the fact that their networks may extend beyond the set of immediate interaction partners. For network surveillance, administrators should support boundary-spanning units, which can be among the first to be cut in tough times. Some research by implementation theorists and others has focused on game theory for understanding networked settings (Stoker, 1991) . Lynn (1993) has used game theory to model multilevel dynamics in social service agencies (see also Koremenos and Lynn, 1996) . Unfortunately, it cannot really be said that this approach models networks; Lynn treats occupants of different levels in the same hierarchy as the interdependent players. The approach does include clients, so the analysis demonstrates the potential for larger constellations. However, it might be argued that these models are misspecified in the opposite fashion than is the case for conventional treatments. Most analysts assume that managers occupy rungs in a hierarchical ladder and downplay horizontal ties, whereas Lynn treats vertical interactions as if they consist of bargaining among formal equals, thus ignoring the inherent power differential.
The broader point is that formal models of networked action must combine both the vertical elements of hierarchy and the horizontal components of functionally induced interdependence (O'Toole, 1993). As suggested below, some work based in public choice has also offered ways of approaching the modeling issue, but here, too, the perspective is limited by the omission of any hierarchical component. At a minimum, hierarchies embedded in or complicating the network game might be included by modeling links between the network game and one or more others (the employment game, the promotion game, the agency game) in which superiors hold many more cards than do subordinates.
Despite its weaknesses as an approach, game theory offers advantages aside from rigor. It puts the set of interdependencies in the foreground, not individual actors or organizations. The full constellation of actors, preferences, and structure matters. This emphasis on the network as a whole also pertains to some recent work offering insightful network analysis. Provan and Milward (1995) provide an example of how theory building for public administration might be guided by the proposition that networks should be taken seriously. They have recently completed an intensive, four-city study of service implementation networks for the severely mentally ill. The arrays consist in each case of many organizations linked in complex, functionally specific patterns. This work marks one of the first efforts to assess network performance and to link performance with structural features of the networks themselves. Network performance is explained here by the degrees and types of integration, external control, stability, and environmental resource munificence of the arrays. Provan and Milward demonstrate that at least in some policy fields, an adequate understanding of administrative performance cannot be achieved without theory building at the network level of analysis.
Contributions from Other Fields. The preceding subsection shows that networks have been treated seriously by some researchers within public administration. But most of the theoretical work has been developed by scholars specializing in other social sciences.
One line of research derives from sociology, where network analysis has been under development. Some efforts have applied such approaches to investigate policy networks (e.g., Pappi, Knoke, and Bisson, 1993), although their use for public administration has yet to emerge. Somewhat more familiar may be the resource dependence/exchange perspective. This work has proven useful for understanding patterns of service provision. More adaptation to the network level and to public administration could prove helpful.
Potentially important theoretical work has been developing from economics as well. One variety is game theory, discussed above. Another is transaction costs economics, which is beginning to receive attention in public administration (Maser, 1986; Thompson, 1993; and Horn, 1995) . A third is public choice, where provocative work is being done by scholars like Elinor Ostrom (1990) , who has combined a public-choice perspective with the analytical strength of game theory to model nonhierarchical collective action efforts involving multiple actors, diverse arrangements, and varying conditions. She has combined this work with a massive review of evidence regarding common-pool resource management around the world, with the aim of building robust inductive theory. In a complementary effort, she has initiated an experimental project to seek answers to how individuals self-organize to solve collective-action problems (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker, 1994) . Findings indicate that successful network performance is related to such features as group size and stability (smaller and more stable clusters are, ceteris paribus, more successful), long-term perspectives, and levels of trust in the array (Ostrom, 1990, 211) . Although Ostrom has little interest in public administration per se, this work offers insights into the kinds of circumstances in which more complex, networked patterns might deliver desired outputs over extended periods of time (for more direct ties to public administration, see Tang, 1991) .
Needs within Public Administration Specialties. Treating networks seriously also means reconsidering many other perspectives that have been brought to bear on the administrative task. Just as the specialty of organizational behavior, for example, has analyzed the microlevel behavioral dimensions of management, it is appropriate to consider how a microanalysis of network action might proceed. In particular, in what ways does this behavior depart from expectations derived from within-agency approaches?
Other specialties can also be informed by the proposition that networks should be treated seriously. Numerous research issues for human resource management are prompted by the network phenomenon. In a recent article, "The Network Society," Peter Drucker ( For public budgeting and finance networked public administration raises new questions and requires theoretical reformulation. An obvious topic is theory regarding fiscal instruments such as contracting, loans and loan guarantees, debt, and in-kind exchanges. Most of these topics have made inroads in the literature, but solid theory remains scarce. Furthermore, ideas about how the structure of resource flows influences public management and decision-making are also needed (Porter, 1973; Provan and Milward, 1995 ).
The Normative Agenda
There is a need for scholarship on normative issues. Unfortunately, despite the crucial character of this subject, the present article can do no more than suggest that it be considered a central topic for future work.
Normative theory is a subject that has hardly been introduced into the networks dialogue as of yet. There is a double irony here. The field of ethical theory has devoted very little attention to organizational as opposed to individual ethical questions, so ethicists in public administration typically rely either on analyses designed for quite different settings than those facing public managers, or they must work from the few efforts aimed particularly at the bureaucratic context (Burke, 1986; Thompson, 1980 
Conclusion
If the theses in this article are accepted-that networks are increasingly becoming important contexts for public administration and that networked settings are different in respects that matter for the conduct of administration-then the set of agendas outlined here must be considered salient. Public administration should attend to several types of network-focused research efforts, each aimed at addressing or redressing a void in scholarship. Each agenda implies sustained, creative, and systematic research. Each can help to craft the basis of a more-informed and realistic, albeit complex, public administration. Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., is a professor in the Department of Political Science and a research associate in the Institute of Community and Area Development at the University of Georgia. He is author, coauthor, or editor of six books and many articles on public administration and public policy. His current research focuses primarily on issues of intergovernmental and interorganizational policy implementation, and he has contributed widely to studies on environmental policy and management.
